Nascere per sbaglio

For a few decades, many courts of western countries are facing the claims for wrongful birth and wrongful life. The paper addresses the issue from a philosophical perspective, analysing the same concept of a “damage from procreation”, in its double face of wrongful birth and wrongful life, and the arguments that support the moral duty of not giving birth to human beings with a health problem. Specifically, it examines the thesis of Harris and Savulescu, according to which such dutifulness derives from the obligation not to introduce unnecessary suffering in the world (Harris) and the Principle of Procreative Beneficence (Savulescu). The analysis is conducted on two levels: the first, remaining in the logic of beneficence and non-maleficence, trying to see if the premises laid down by the two authors lead to the conclusion of the existence of this moral obligation; in the second, discussing some of the theoretical premises of these theses.